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Lending corruption is an important agency problem for banks. Using data from the World Bank 
Business Environmental Survey, we find that in countries with more corruption, banks give more 
favorable loan terms to borrowers. This relation is stronger when firms are under more financing 
constraints, consistent with corruption being important to obtaining favorable loan terms when the 
supply of debt capital is tighter. In line with the expectation that monitoring constrains agency 
problems, this relation is weaker in countries with higher foreign ownership of banks or where 
Protestantism is the primary religion. In the syndicated loan market, participant banks are inclined 
to lend less in countries where lending corruption is more prevalent. Firms in countries with greater 
corruption prefer private bank debt over public bonds and are more leveraged. Banks in countries 
with more lending corruption have poor loan quality, worse earnings performance, and are more 
susceptible to trouble during a financial crisis. Overall, our findings suggest that corruption greases 
the wheels for borrowers but is detrimental to bank shareholders. 
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There is a common saying that corruption is a cancer in society. A critical report on 
corruption by The World Bank on September 26, 2017, states, “Businesses and individuals pay an 
estimated $1.5 trillion in bribes each year. This is about 2% of global GDP—and ten times the 
value of overseas development assistance. The harm that corruption causes to development is, in 
fact, a multiple of the estimated volume, given the negative impact of corruption on the poor and 
economic growth.”1 The consequences of corruption in banking services can be deep and far-
reaching because this sector is one of the most vital of the economy. By collecting deposits and 
providing credit to individuals, families, and businesses, the banking system is often deemed as 
the lifeblood of the economy and instrumental to its growth both within and across the country 
(King and Levine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004; Levine, 
2005). For decades, policymakers have been struggling to promote an efficient and safe 
institutional environment for banking, with corruption being one of the most pervasive and 
difficult challenges—for policymakers, bank regulators, and banks. 
In this paper, we extend the recent literature on lending corruption (e.g., Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Barth et al., 2009; Houston, Lin, and Ma, 2011; Akins, Dou, and Ng, 
2017) by examining how lending corruption affects loan contracts. Similar to this literature, we 
refer to lending corruption as the bribery of bank officials.2 Bank officials who accept bribes pose 
an important agency problem within the bank as they are more likely to sacrifice the bank’s 
interests (and those of its capital providers, including depositors) for personal gains (Bardhan, 
1997; Donadelli, Fasan, and Magnanelli, 2014). Lending corruption is distinct from many other 
                                                           
1 http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption.  
2 To the extent that a loan contract is tainted by corruption, the most direct way the corruption is accomplished is 
likely by bribing bank officials. This is the key reason that we focus on lending corruption. Other methods could 
include bribing politicians or regulators to pressure the bank to grant loans with favorable terms. 
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forms (e.g., political corruption) in that it refers specifically to the dishonest or illegal transfer of 
benefits directly to the lender’s agents by the borrower in return for benefits to the borrowers at 
the time of the loan contract. Recent research on lending corruption has explored its various 
determinants such as bank supervision, private monitoring, and bank competition (e.g., Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Barth et al., 2009; Houston, Lin, and Ma, 2011). Following 
these studies, we rely on the voluntarily-supplied answer to the survey question in the World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES) on respondents’ experience of dealing with corrupted bank 
officials in the context of borrowing for the growth and operation of businesses. Based on face-to-
face interviews with firm managers and owners, this survey collected the data on firms’ business 
environment in many dimensions, including lending corruption, investment climate, and lobbying, 
etc. Similar to many studies that rely on survey responses to examine how country-level factors 
affect corporate outcomes, we take the average of the responses in each country to construct a 
measure of the degree of lending corruption in that country. We then link this measure to loan 
contracts in the country to examine how lending corruption affects loan contracting.3  
Ex-ante, one might expect either a positive or negative effect of lending corruption on loan 
terms. On the one hand, under the bank agency cost hypothesis, the borrower gives a bribe to the 
bank’s agent to seek a more favorable outcome. Bribery is the giving of money, goods or other 
forms of recompense to a recipient to induce a change in behavior (to the giver’s benefit/interest) 
that would otherwise not occur (Tanzi, 1998). Lending corruption can be viewed from the 
perspective of a principal-agent framework in which there are three parties: two principals—bank 
                                                           
3 The use of a country-level measure is driven by necessity as it is not possible to directly measure the amount of 
lending corruption in a specific loan contract. The respondents of the survey are presumably potential and actual 
borrowers. A country-level corruption level thus captures the extent to which potential and actual borrowers have to 
deal with corrupted bank officials. The anonymity of the survey respondents reduces the likelihood of respondent 
bias due to concerns about being implicated for engaging in bribery of bank officials.  
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and borrower—and one agent, a bank official (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Groenendijk, 1997). 
In this framework, the bribe renders the corrupt bank official an agent of the borrower who is 
incentivized to offer the borrower a more favorable outcome, to the detriment of the bank. To 
illustrate this point, assume that without a bribe, the loan interest rate for a $1 million one-year 
loan is 10%. The firm pays of a bribe of $10,000 to the bank official, who lowers the interest rate 
to 6%. The bank loses $40,000, with $10,000 going to the bank official and $30,000 going to the 
borrower. In other words, within this framework, a wealth transfer takes place between the two 
principals and the corrupted agent, with the bank suffering from an agency cost. This wealth 
transfer can take many different forms; a lower interest rate is only an illustration. Granting a loan 
larger than optimal amount or longer than optimal duration can also benefit the borrower at the 
expense of the bank. Hence, in the context of a loan contract tainted by bribes to bank officials, 
the bank agency cost hypothesis would predict better loan terms for borrowers in countries with 
greater lending corruption.4  
In contrast, under the protection against corruption risk hypothesis, one might argue that 
banks can ex-ante protect themselves from corruption by tightening the loan terms in expectation 
of possible corruption by their bank officials. Indeed, some studies on corruption, though not about 
lending corruption specifically, find that it is associated with worse loan terms. For example, Qi, 
Roth, and Wald (2010) find that countries with greater political corruption have a higher cost of 
debt for corporate bonds issued by firms. They infer that when political corruption weakens legal 
recourse, creditors protect against misappropriation of their capital. Weill (2011) finds that a higher 
level of general corruption reduces banks’ willingness to lend, consistent with corruption reducing 
                                                           
4 To the extent that one regards a corrupt bank official as also an agent of the borrower by virtue of the bribe, one 
can view the situation as one in which the borrower benefits from having the bank official as an agent. Hence, a 
corollary to the bank agency cost hypothesis could be the borrower agency benefit hypothesis. 
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creditors’ legal protection. The general intuition underlying these papers is that banks have a pre-
contracting expectation of losses arising from the actions of the borrowers and thus establish 
safeguards.  Similarly, one could argue that banks in countries where bribing bank officials is 
endemic could tighten lending policies because they have greater pre-contracting expectations that 
bribery of bank officials could be costly for the banks.5 It is important to note that lending 
corruption, unlike other forms such as political or judicial corruption, directly benefits bank 
officials. It is thus more ambiguous whether banks officials are willing and/or able to effectively 
implement safeguards to protect shareholders’ interests.6 Nevertheless, to the extent that one sees 
banks as implementing safeguards against a culture of lending corruption, protecting against the 
corruption risk hypothesis would predict worse loan terms for the borrowers in places where there 
is greater lending corruption.7  
The bank agency cost and protection against corruption risk hypotheses are not mutually 
exclusive. One important reason is that in any society, agency problems and actions in response to 
these problems is likely to be an ongoing and dynamic process. Hence, we view the effect of 
lending corruption on loan terms as an empirical question and a starting point for conducting richer 
analyses into the on-average effect. 
We begin our empirical analyses by linking three key characteristics of loan contracts— 
loan spreads, loan amounts, and loan maturity—to lending corruption across twenty-three different 
                                                           
5 This argument is akin to the notion that when banks have higher expected loan losses from lending to riskier 
borrowers, they would ex-ante adjust loan policies, e.g., requiring higher interest rates or reducing loan duration, to 
protect their interests. 
6 A large agency literature highlights that when self-interest is at stake, the agent is less likely to take action, 
including developing and implementing policies that sacrifice their own self-interest to benefit the principal (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). 
7 This hypothesis does not assume that every bank official corrupt. Instead, in a place with greater lending 
corruption, there is a relatively higher likelihood that a bank official is corrupt. Ex ante, a bank does not know 




countries. We find that corruption is associated with lower loan spreads, longer loan maturity, and 
larger loan size. These results suggest that borrowers enjoy better loan terms when lending 
corruption is more prevalent. To the extent that bribery induces bank officials to sacrifice the 
bank’s interest, favorable borrower loan terms reflect wealth transfer from the banks to the 
borrowers. To deal with the usual endogeneity concerns in archival research, we rely on two 
approaches: 1) a difference-in-differences analysis relying on the anti-corruption law reforms that 
were carried out in a few countries and 2) an instrumental variables approach using, as instruments, 
various country-level variables that prior literature has suggested to be determinants of lending 
corruption and are arguably exogenous to the terms in individual loan contracts. We continue to 
find that lending corruption is linked to better loan terms. 
In further analyses, we find that the positive relation between lending corruption and 
favorable loan terms is stronger for firms in financial distress, indicating that corruption is more 
important in improving loan terms when firms face greater capital constraints. This relation is 
weaker in countries with higher foreign bank ownership or Protestantism as its primary religion, 
consistent with monitoring being important in constraining bank agency problems such as lending 
corruption.  
Next, we go beyond simply examining terms in loan contracts and study how lending 
corruption impacts loan syndication. We find that for loan contracts in countries with more lending 
corruption, there is a lower likelihood of a loan being a syndicated loan. Among syndicated loans, 
there are fewer participant banks and the lead bank loan allocation is higher. These findings suggest 
that in a country with higher lending corruption, lead banks have more difficulty in structuring 
syndicated loans due to concerns of potential bank agency problems related to lending corruption 
at the lead banks (Sufi, 2007).  
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We then shift our focus from loan- to firm-level analysis by examining how lending 
corruption affects firms’ debt choice and the capital structure. We find that where there is lending 
corruption (by bank officials), firms demonstrate a preference for private bank debt over public 
bonds and rely more on debt as a source of capital. These findings, together with the earlier results 
on loan terms, suggest that firms, rather than shy away from bank officials who demand bribes, 
make use of bribery opportunities to “grease the wheels” and engage in more advantageous debt 
financing. Such a choice is consistent with the earlier results that loan terms are better when greater 
lending corruption is present.   
  Finally, as discussed in the bank agency cost hypothesis, the likelihood of banks 
experiencing bad outcomes increases when their officials make decisions out of self-benefit and 
favor the borrowers to the bank’s detriment. Earlier evidence on the link between lending 
corruption and loan terms (e.g., lower interest spreads), while suggestive of banks being adversely 
affected by lending corruption, does not directly address the issue of whether banks suffer when 
bank officials are corrupt. Consistent with corrupt agents being costly to the bank, we find that 
banks in countries with more lending corruption have poor loan quality, worse earnings 
performance, and are more likely to get into trouble during a financial crisis. The result linking 
lending corruption to troubled banks is an important one because troubled banks can create 
significant spillover effects onto other sectors of the economy, as well as onto taxpayers via bank 
bailouts (Gorton and Huang, 2004). 
Our paper contributes in two ways. First, we contribute to the literature related to 
corruption in debt financing. Research in this literature typically documents results relating to 
general corruption and political corruption/connection. Using bank loans in Pakistan, Khwaja and 
Mian (2005) find that politically connected firms can obtain bank loans more easily but have higher 
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default rates. This effect is primarily driven by state-owned banks. A similar study by Houston et 
al. (2014) examines the impact of political connections on the cost of debt in a US setting. They 
find that firms with politically connected board members enjoy a lower cost of debt. Detragiache, 
Tressel, and Gupta (2008) find that general corruption is negatively correlated with bank credit to 
the private sector. Weill (2011) finds that a higher level of corruption is negatively correlated with 
banks’ willingness to lend, consistent with the notion that corruption increases the uncertainties 
about judicial decisions for banks and thus decreases the legal protections for creditors. Park 
(2012) documents that non-performing loans increase in countries plagued by higher corruption 
among public officials and politicians; they attribute this finding to the bribery of politicians 
reducing bank soundness.  
Our paper complements and contrasts with the existing literature by focusing specifically 
on lending corruption, as opposed to the public sector or political corruption. As noted earlier, 
lending corruption is that which is specific to the parties involved in loan contracting. To conduct 
a comprehensive analysis of this issue, we examine how lending corruption affects the terms in 
individual loan contracts, as well as several corporate-level outcomes for borrowers and lenders. 
Our large-sample empirical study takes a multi-faceted view of the contracting issue by first 
looking at the impact on the loan terms, then the choices and outcomes of the contracting parties.8 
Taken together, our evidence indicates that corrupt bank officials, while greasing wheels for the 
borrower, are harmful to the banks.   
Second, our paper contributes to the cross-country bank loan contracting literature (e.g., 
Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; Kim, Tsui, and Yi, 2011; Giannetti and Yafeh, 
2012; Chen et al., 2016). A strand of literature investigates the impact of legal environments on 
                                                           
8 Some studies consider how business contracts are influenced by corruption, typically in the form of case studies 
and news reports (Bhargava and Bolongaita, 2004; Ratley, 2014; New York Times, 2015). 
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bank loan contracting (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009). They find that in countries 
with stronger legal enforcement and better creditor protections, bank loans are more likely to have 
a lower interest rate, larger size, and longer maturity. Kim, Tsui, and Yi (2011) investigate the 
effect of IFRS adoption on bank loan contracting and find that IFRS adopters have a lower cost of 
debt, larger loan size, and longer maturity. Another vein of the literature shifts studies informal 
institutions. Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) find that cultural differences between lenders and 
borrowers lead to a higher cost of debt, smaller loan size, and shorter maturity. Chen et al. (2016) 
find that religiosity is negatively related to the cost of a bank loan. We extend the prior literature 
by documenting that bribing loan officials also plays an important role in these contracts. To the 
extent that more favorable loan terms are viewed as wealth transfers from the banks to the bribers, 
we also document that formal institutions (deposit insurance) and informal institutions (religion) 
can affect wealth transfers driven by corruption. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the relevant literature in Section 
2, describe the data and sample and present the research design in Section 3. We discuss the results 
in Section 4 and provide robustness checks in Section 5. We conclude our research in Section 6. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In research linking corruption to economic development, several studies indicate that 
corruption has negative effects on private investment, government expenditure, human capital 
development, foreign direct investment, and international aid effectiveness (e.g., Murphy, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Bardhan, 1997; Ehrlich and Lui, 1999; Mauro, 1995; 
Wei, 2000; Mo, 2001; Aidt, 2009). For example, Mauro (1995) finds that corruption lowers private 
investment, thereby lowering economic growth. Mo (2001) documents that corruption 
significantly reduces economic growth through the very important channel of political instability.  
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Some economists take the somewhat controversial view that corruption might be 
economically beneficial. In a country where bureaucracy is ubiquitous, corruption can help cut 
through red tape and may not be an obstacle to economic growth (Leff, 1964; Leys, 1965; 
Huntington, 2002; Aidt, 2003). In other words, entrepreneurs may find more willing to start new 
companies and firms can invest more easily if they can use “speed money” to facilitate borrowing 
and mitigate the distortions that arise from ill-functioning institutions. Lui (1985) theoretically 
demonstrates that corruption may be an efficient way of reducing the time cost of queues. Meon 
and Weill (2010) find that corruption is less detrimental to efficiency in countries where 
institutions are less effective. They find that corruption may even be positively associated with 
efficiency in countries with extremely ineffective institutions. In fact, both South Korea and 
Indonesia saw their economies boom despite of rampant graft and corruption during the post-war 
years. 
The literature on corruption tends to focus on that of politicians or government agencies. 
However, there is also significant private sector corruption. In particular, the banking system is 
one area where corruption is a major problem, especially in developing countries (Barth, Caprio, 
and Levine, 2006). In addition, lending corruption can be very costly because when bank managers 
lend depositors’ money to businesses not solely based on efficiency considerations, fewer funds 
are available to support more credible and deserving business activities (Barth et al., 2009).  
Perhaps not surprisingly, many real-life cases of corruption take place within the banking 
sector where bank officials are offered bribes to grant loans. Here are some anecdotes about 
lending corruption in both developing and developed countries:  
Russia: “The traditional envelopes (and later briefcases) filled with cash were replaced by 
low-interest credits” (Levin and Satarov, 2000).  
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India: “Instances of borrowers taking care of a senior banker’s child’s education overseas 
or picking up the tab for wedding reception of the daughter and even honeymoon at Bali 
are not rare. There are also borrowers who offer “annuity” to bank chiefs after their 
retirement to express their gratitude for the support extended to them in appraisal of loan 
proposals and disbursements of loans.” (Bandyopadhyay, 2016) 
United States: “More than 100 former Wells Fargo loan officers accepted kickbacks—  
including one former employee’s wife who collected tens of thousands of dollars in 
payments” (The New York Times, 2015).  
Given human nature and secrecy of lending corruption, available reports of corruption in 
the banking sector are likely to reflect only the tip of the iceberg. While such corruption has come 
under the media spotlight in recent years, it has also attracted the attention of many academic 
researchers, with several studies examining the determinants of bank/lending corruption. For 
example, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006) show that traditional official supervision does 
not constrain lending corruption, but the private monitoring of banks through the timely disclosure 
of accurate information can reduce it. Barth et al. (2009) and Houston, Lin, and Ma (2011) find 
that banking competition and information sharing can help lower lending corruption, while the 
state ownership of media and media concentration increases it. In a recent study by Akins, Dou, 
and Ng (2017), the effect of country-level timely loan loss recognition by banks is shown to help 
constrain lending corruption because it increases the probability that troubled loans will be 
uncovered.  
Despite a number of factors having been shown to determine lending corruption, there has 
been limited direct research into the relation between lending corruption and loan contracts. 
Having a better understanding of such a relationship is important because banks play an important 
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role in credit provision in the economy through the formation of loan contracts (e.g., Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983; Demirguc-Kunt, Feven, and Levine, 2013). To the extent that the lending contract 
is tainted by corruption, the most common way to engage in corruption is likely to be through 
bribing bank officials; as noted earlier, in the analysis that follows we refer to such bribery as 
lending corruption.  In particular, we extend the existing literature on lending corruption by 
examining the effect of lending corruption on bank lending. To the best of our knowledge, our 
paper is the first to examine the link between the bribing of bank officials and loan contracts. 
3. DATA 
3.1 Measurement of Lending Corruption 
While corruption is undoubtedly an important issue, studying issues related to it has been 
challenging because it is difficult to measure. Some studies have attempted to measure corruption 
using an epidemiological approach (Fernández, 2011; Liu, 2016), that is, when individuals 
emigrate from their native country to a new one, their culture of corruption travels with them and 
is inherited by their descendants. Some studies have relied on legal cases of corruption in court, a 
typical measure of political corruption (Smith, 2016; Dass, Nanda, and Xiao, 2017). Other studies, 
including ours, have relied on surveys (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Barth et al., 2009; 
Houston, Lin, and Ma, 2011; Zheng et al., 2013; Akins, Dou, and Ng, 2017). Each method has its 
advantages and disadvantages and is more suited to some settings than others. 
In our setting, our key explanatory variable of interest is Lending Corruption, which we 
construct using data from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES 2000) conducted by 
the World Bank in 1999-2000. Using face-to-face interviews with owners, managers, directors, or 
the employees of companies over late 1999 and early 2000, this survey is designed to generate 
measures on lending corruption, lobbying, judiciary system, and other factors in the business 
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environment in 80 different countries that cover emerging, developing, and developed economies. 
Many studies have used response to the question about the lending corruption to study issues 
related bribery of bank officials (e.g., Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Barth et al., 2009; 
Houston, Lin, and Ma, 2011; Zheng et al., 2013; Akins, Dou, and Ng, 2017). Specifically, the 
question is: “Is the corruption of bank officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your 
business?”9 The response to this question ranges from 1 to 4, with higher values indicating higher 
levels of lending corruption. 
In our study, we construct a country-level measure, Lending Corruption, using firms’ 
responses to the above question: Similar to how many country-level indices are constructed in the 
literature and by many international organizations, we compute Lending Corruption by take the 
average of the responses in each country.10  
There are at least three key advantages to using this data to study corruption within the 
banking system. First and foremost, the survey question is specifically related to lending corruption. 
Corruption is inherently complex practice—depending on the different parties involved (e.g., 
bribe-givers vs. bribe-takers), one might expect different outcomes depending on the specific 
nature of the corruption.11 This survey provides direct measurement on bribery of bank officials in 
the loan contracting process. Second, the survey question is also crafted in a way that solicits 
honest feedback from the respondents. In particular, the question does not ask whether the 
                                                           
9 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006) present an extensive discussion of this lending corruption measure. 
10 Following Edwards (1992) and Chen et al (2016), we also construct an alternative weighted lending corruption 
index for each country. We use the number of survey responses in each country as the weight. All of our results are 
robust to using this alternative index. 
11 For example, the corruption of foreign public officials (e.g., Pacini, Swingen, and Rogers, 2002) might have no 
effect on loan contracting because it is unlikely that foreign public officials are involved in the loan contracting 
process within a country. Political corruption within the country might lead to weaker creditor rights post-
contracting and banks ex-ante trying to protect against weaker rights (e.g., Qi, Roth, and Wald, 2010; Weill, 2011). 
Lending corruption typically takes place pre-contracting and affects loan decisions. The key party in this form of 




respondent has participated in any lending corruption. Instead, it asks the extent to which lending 
corruption is a hindrance to the business. The survey’s anonymity also helps to reduce bias in the 
response. Third, this survey provides comprehensive coverage on firms of various sizes, industries, 
and ownership within each country. One could regard the respondents as being actual or potential 
borrowers. A limitation of the survey data, however, is that the lending corruption question was 
only asked in the year 2000 survey, not in subsequent surveys.12 However, we believe that a culture 
of lending corruption or any form of corruption within a country is unlikely to change over a short 
period. 
3.2 Measurement of Bank Loan Contracts 
 To examine the effects of lending corruption on bank loan contracting, we study both the 
pricing (Loan Spread) and non-pricing terms (Loan Size and Loan Maturity) of bank loan contracts 
and use them as our dependent variables. In particular, we use all-in-spread drawn, that is, the 
interest spread over LIBOR plus associated loan origination fees as the measure of the loan spread 
or interest rate.  For the non-pricing terms, we use the loan amount in billions of US dollars as 
measures of loan size, and the time to mature in months as measures of loan maturity. We take the 
natural logarithm of each of the three variables when we perform the regression analysis. 
 3.3 Sample 
The unit of our analysis is at the firm-loan level. We obtain bank loan data from Dealscan, 
which contains detailed loan information (e.g., loan spread, loan size, loan maturity, loan types, 
etc.) from 34 countries. We use the linking table provided by Chava and Roberts (2008) to match 
the bank loan data with borrowers’ financial information in the Compustat Global database. It is 
worth to note that over half of the non-US bank loans do not have loan spread information in 
                                                           
12 For most countries, the WBES is conducted every 3 or 4 years. 
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Dealscan. To maximize the sample size, we follow Qian and Strahan (2007) and Kim, Tsui, and Yi 
(2011) and require bank loan facilities to have data only on non-pricing terms (i.e., Loan Size and 
Loan Maturity). We then use the matched firm-loan data to merge with the WBES survey and we 
are left with a sample of 23 countries. We further exclude firms in the utilities and finance 
industries since they are highly regulated and their financial reporting is different from other firms. 
We also control for a series of country-level characteristics, including GDP, economic growth, 
inflation, the rule of law, law origination, political and creditor rights protection, and public sector 
corruption. Appendix A presents sources for these data. By excluding observations that lack the 
necessary data to construct the control variables used in our empirical tests, our final sample 
consists of 31,414 bank loan facilities made in 23 countries from 1995 to 2005.13 Assuming the 
WBES captures the lending corruption deeply rooted in a country’s social and political values, we 
impute its results from 2000 to all the years in our sample.14 We choose 1995 as the initial year 
because few non-US bank loans are covered by Dealscan until the middle of the 1990s (Qian and 
Stranhan, 2007). Since the lending corruption data are from WBES (2000), to get a balanced 
sample, we choose 2005 as the final year of our sample.15 
3.4 Research Design 
To evaluate the impact of lending corruption on the bank loan contracting terms, we 
estimate the following empirical model: 
                                                           
13 The twenty-three countries are Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the USA, 
and the United Kingdom. Eleven countries are dropped due to missing lending corruption information, including 
Australia, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, and 
Taiwan. 
14 In a different setting, Favara, Schroth, and Valta (2012) and Favara et al. (2017) also choose to impute a survey 
result to a 10 year interval (pre and post 5 years). We therefore believe the interval from 1995 to 2005 is a 
reasonable window of time for our study.  
15 In a robustness test, we change the sample interval from 10 to 20 years. We use 1990 to 2010 as the sample 
interval and find that our results are still robust. 
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Bank Loan Contracting Measures = f {Lending Corruption, Loan Terms Controls, Firm-
level Controls, Country-level Controls, Industry and Year fixed effects}.                                   (1) 
In the regression, the dependent variables are one of the three bank loan terms: the cost of debt (Ln 
(Loan Spread)), loan size (Ln (Loan Size)), and loan maturity (Ln (Loan Maturity)). We include 
industry and year fixed effects. The industry fixed effects control for all time-invariant industry 
characteristics, and year fixed effects condition out the influences of time-series trends. Drawing 
on prior studies on the determinants of the costs of bank loans (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Graham, 
Li, and Qiu, 2008; Qi, Roth, and Wald, 2010; Kim, Tsui, and Yi, 2011; Chen et al., 2016), we 
control for a series of loan-, borrower-, and country-level variables in our baseline model. First, 
we include a set of bank loan-related terms including loan size, loan maturity, and performance 
pricing. Second, we include firm-level (i.e., borrower-level) characteristics: Ln (Firm Size) is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is gross property, plant, and equipment scaled by total 
assets. Leverage is current and long-term debt scaled by total assets. ROA is pre-tax income scaled 
by total assets. Finally, we include a series of country-level controls that may affect the loan 
contracting terms. In particular, we control for the following variables: Ln (GDP) is the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita in US dollars. Economic Growth is the GDP growth rate. Inflation is 
the inflation rate measured by CPI. English (French, German) Law is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the origin of the company law or the country’s commercial code is English Common 
(French Civil, German Civil) Law, zero otherwise. Rule of Law refers to the assessment of the law 
and order tradition in the country produced by the country-risk rating agency International Country 
Risk (ICR), scaling from 0 to 10 with a higher score indicating more of a tradition of law and order. 
Political Rights is an index provided by Freedom House that evaluates the degree of freedom in 
the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government; it 
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ranges from 1 (strong political rights) to 7 (weak rights). Creditor Rights refers to the creditor 
rights index proposed by La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) which measures the legal rights of creditors 
against defaulting debtors in different jurisdictions. This index ranges from 0 to 4, with higher 
values indicating stronger creditor power. Public Sector Corruption is measured as (-1)*Control 
of Corruption, which captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by 
elites and private interests. This index ranges from -2.19 to 1.04. Higher values of Public Sector 
Corruption indicate higher levels of corruption.   
3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables used in our analysis. Panel A of 
Table 1 reports the mean of the country-level variables by country. Column 1 shows that the three 
most (least) corrupt countries with regard to lending are Thailand, Pakistan, and Indonesia (the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, and Canada), which are is generally consistent with other prior studies 
(Zheng et al., 2013; Akins, Dou, and Ng, 2017).  In terms of economic characteristics, India has 
the highest economic growth rate of 14% and Turkey has the highest inflation rate of 33%. The 
top four countries for GDP per capita are Sweden, the USA, the United Kingdom and Germany. 
The data on the origin of the company law or commercial code of the country show that nine 
(twelve, one) are English common (French civil, German civil) law countries. Canada, Sweden, 
and the United States have the highest rule of law enforcement. Regarding political rights 
protection, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, USA, and United Kingdom rank 
higher than other countries. In addition, six countries have relatively higher creditor rights 
protection than others: Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, and the United 
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Kingdom. 16  The extent of public sector corruption is high in Pakistan, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines. Regarding the sampling frequency, US firms dominate in our sample, followed by 
firms in United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Germany. Since the number of observations varies 
across countries, following Edwards (1992) and Chen et al. (2016), we also employ country-
weighted regressions to control for the country representation issue in a robustness check and find 
that all our results still hold. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of bank loan-level variables. The mean 
(median) value of loan spread is 181 (175) basis points over LIBOR. The average loan amount is 
260 million USD and the number of the months to maturity is 48.44 months. 37.8% of our sample 
observations have a performance pricing provision, and in terms of loan structure, on average, lead 
banks hold 25.1% of the loan. Panel C of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the firm-level 
variables, which we include as control variables.  
Regarding the country-level variables, shown in Panel D of Table 1, the mean of lending 
corruption is 1.68, suggesting that on average, firms consider lending corruption to be between   
“no” and a “minor” obstacle for the operation and growth of their business. Other economic 
indicators show that the average GDP growth rate and inflation rate are 0.056 and 0.077, 
respectively. The mean of the GDP per capita is 14,436.39 USD. Panel D of Table 1 also shows 
that 39.1% (52.2% and 4.4%) of observations are from English (French, German) legal origin. 
Finally, the averages of Rule of Law, Political Rights, Creditor Rights, and Public Sector 
Corruption are 6.467, 5.696, 2.217, and -0.518, respectively. 
                                                           
16 We note that the values for creditor rights in La Porta et al. (1998) are slightly different from those in Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). For example, Egypt’s creditor rights value is 4 in La Porta et al. (1998) but 2 in 
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). Since our sample is from 1990 through 2009, we choose to use the data 
version in La Porta et al. (1998), which is roughly in the middle of our sample. Our results are still robust if we use 




4.1 The Effects of Lending Corruption on Bank Loan Contracting - Baseline 
Table 2 reports the estimates of equation (1), where the dependent variables are Ln (Loan 
Spread) in Column (1), Ln (Loan Size) in Column (2) and Ln (Loan Maturity) in Column (3). In 
seeking to assess the impact of lending corruption on loan contracting, we focus on the estimated 
coefficient on Lending Corruption. Column (1) shows that this coefficient is -0.490 (t=-5.89), 
indicating that increasing bribes to bank officials reduces the cost of debt. Based on the estimation 
in Column (1), a one-standard-deviation increase in lending corruption (i.e., the lending corruption 
index increases by 0.581) reduces the cost of debt by more than 59.69 basis points, which is 32.98% 
of the sample mean. 17  
Concerning the firm-level control variables (Column 1 of Table 2), leverage is positively 
related to loan spread, indicating that banks perceive firms with higher leverage as being a higher 
credit risk. Moreover, firms with larger assets, higher ROA, and a higher tangible assets ratio pay 
a lower cost of debt. In terms of the country-level control variables, we find that consistent with 
Bae and Goyal (2009) and Qi, Roth, and Wald (2010), both creditor rights and political rights 
protection are associated with a lower loan spread. It is worth emphasizing that the coefficient on 
Public Sector Corruption is positive and significant, suggesting that the cost of debt increases 
when there is public sector corruption. This result is consistent with that in Qi, Roth, and Wald 
(2010), who suggest that banks charge higher spreads to cover the cost of potential tunneling (i.e., 
transfer of assets from borrowers to other parties) facilitated by public sector corruption. Hence, 
our findings show that after controlling for the effect of general public sector corruption, lending 
corruption helps reduce lending costs, which is consistent with the “greases the wheels” argument.  
                                                           
17 It was calculated as e(-0.490*0.581) =(1/0.752)-1=32.98%. 
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In Column (2) of Table 2, the coefficient on Lending Corruption is 0.099 (t=3.59), 
suggesting a positive and significant relationship between lending corruption and Ln (Loan Size). 
A one-standard-deviation increase in lending corruption increases the loan size by USD 15.37 
million, which is 5.91% of the sample mean.18 The results of the control variables suggest that 
loan size is larger when bank loans have a shorter maturity, when borrowers have a larger firm 
size and a higher tangibility ratio, and when firms are located in countries with better political 
rights or creditor rights protection. 
Column (3) reports the impact of lending corruption on loan maturity. The estimated 
coefficient on Lending Corruption is positive and significant (t=2.72), suggesting that lending 
corruption is associated with a longer loan maturity. In terms of economic magnitude, a one-
standard-deviation increase in lending corruption increases loan maturity by four months, which 
is 8.33% of the sample mean.19 Clearly, this economic impact is not trivial. Regarding the control 
variables, loan size is negatively related to loan maturity. Performance pricing, firm size, leverage, 
ROA, political rights, and creditor rights are positively associated with loan maturity. The results 
on the control variables are generally in line with findings in the existing bank loan literature (e.g., 
Qian and Strahan, 2007; Graham, Li, and Qiu, 2008; Bae and Goyal, 2009). 
Taken together, our results are consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis that 
corruption in the banking sector greases the wheels of business and materially benefits loan 
borrowers with preferential lending treatment. 
4.2 Endogeneity  
  Our baseline empirical results so far show a strong and consistent relationship between 
lending corruption and loan pricing, loan amount, and loan maturity. However, reverse causality 
                                                           
18 It was calculated as e(0.099*0.581) -1=e(0.040) -1= 5.91%. 
19 It was calculated as e(0.138*0.581) -1=e(0.080) -1=8.33%. 
20 
 
is a potential threat to reliable inferences in our analysis. Although it is not very likely that one 
firm’s loan contract would cause a country’s lending corruption level to shift, it may still be 
plausible that the preferential treatment could encourage bribes and collectively foster the 
prevalence of corruption in a country. Also, despite including a series of firm, loan, and 
macroeconomic controls and industry and year fixed effects in the regressions, there are still some 
concerns about omitted variable bias. If unknown factors (e.g., bank officer characteristics) are 
correlated with both lending corruption and bank loan contract terms, then our earlier results on 
the impact of lending corruption will be biased. Although it is extremely difficult to completely 
eliminate endogeneity bias, in this section, we attempt to address this problem using 1) a 
difference-in-differences analysis relying on the anti-corruption law reforms that took place in a 
few countries and 2) an instrumental variables approach. 
4.2.1 Anti-corruption law reforms 
As our first test for endogeneity, we focus on anti-corruption laws passed in 23 countries 
during our sample period and use them as a natural experiment for implementing the difference-
in-differences analysis. In particular, we focus on anti-corruption laws that seek to restrain 
domestic bribery between private parties. If lending corruption reduces borrowing costs and anti-
corruption laws are instrumental to constraining this type of corruption, then firms in countries 
where such laws are in force will arguably receive worse loan terms relative to those in countries 
without similar laws. We therefore use a difference-in-differences framework to study how lending 
terms change after a country’s anti-corruption laws take effect. 
To collect the anti-corruption law data, we rely on the 2017 Global Overview of Anti-
Bribery Laws Handbook and examine the anti-corruption laws of the 23 countries in our sample 
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from 1995 to 2005.20 The handbook documents six legal framework dimensions related to bribery, 
namely, domestic bribery (private to public), domestic bribery (private to private), the corruption 
of foreign public officials, facilitation payments, compliance programs, and regulators with the 
jurisdiction to prosecute corruption. We focus on one of the dimensions, i.e. domestic bribery 
(private to private), because in this paper we study bribery between two private parties—borrowers 
and lenders. Out of the 23 countries in our sample, we identify four anti-corruption legal reforms 
passed between 1995 and 2005, in Pakistan, Peru, Sweden, and Turkey. For example, in Pakistan, 
there was a major anti-corruption reform in 1999. This reform, known as the National 
Accountability Ordinance (NAO), stipulated the corruption and corrupt practices subject to 
punishment. This ordinance also specified that corruption and corrupt practices would result in a 
prison term of up to 14 years.21  
We define an indicator variable, Anti-Corruption Law Reforms, as equal to one if it is 
within the post-reform period for the four countries and zero otherwise. This variable is also coded 
as zero for all the other 19 countries. We expect anti-corruption legal reforms to constrain lending 
corruption and to lead to more stringent loan terms. Regarding the model specification, we replace 
Lending Corruption from our baseline model with Anti-Corruption Law Reforms. We control for 
firm fixed effects that effectively condition out all the time-invariant firm characteristics that may 
contribute to loan costs. Table 3 reports the estimation results. We find that the coefficients of 
Anti-Corruption Law Reforms are significantly positive on loan spread (Column 1) and 
significantly negative on loan maturity (Column 3), indicating that after anti-corruption legal 
reforms, the loan spread increases and loan maturity decreases. This result corroborates our 
                                                           
20 The data are also available on this website: https://globalcompliancenews.com/anti-corruption/anti-corruption-
laws-around-the-world/. The database provides the anti-corruption legal framework for 46 jurisdictions regulating 
domestic bribery across both developed and developing countries.   
21 More details of the NAO can be found here: http://www.nab.gov.pk/Downloads/nao.asp#Corruption_12. 
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previous findings that higher lending corruption is associated with more favorable loan contract 
terms. 
4.2.2 Instrumental variables analysis 
In our second attempt to address potential endogeneity problems, we use the instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation method. The underlying assumption on these instrumental variables is 
that they are highly correlated with lending corruption but they (arguably) do not directly affect 
bank loan contracting terms, except through the lending corruption channel (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009). Similar to prior papers that investigate the effect of cross-country characteristics (e.g., Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Barth et al., 2009; Houston, Lin, and Ma, 2011), we consider 
multiple country-level variables used in the prior literature that are reasonably exogenous to loan 
contracting terms and that are likely to have explanatory power for lending corruption.22 
Our first instrument of lending corruption is State Media Ownership, which is measured 
by the market share of state-owned newspapers out of the aggregate market share of the five largest 
daily newspapers (by circulation) (Djankov et al., 2003). Houston, Lin, and Ma (2011) show that 
greater media concentration and state ownership of the media increases the odds of lending 
corruption. It is unlikely that media concentration affects the terms of individual loan contracts. 
Following prior literature (e.g., Beck et al, 2003, 2006; Barth et al., 2009; Houston, Lin, 
and Ma, 2011), we also search for potential instrumental variables for a culture of lending 
corruption based on the endowment theory. Under this theory, the geographic environment plays 
a role in shaping institutional development. In line with the prior literature, we consider three 
                                                           
22 Similar to these papers, we do not claim that these variables are the best instrument variables. Instead, we are 
looking for reasonable instrumental variables that prior literature does not document as having a direct effect on loan 
contracting terms (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). 
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measures as instrumental variables: latitude (Latitude), ethnic fractionalization (Ethnic 
Fractionalization), and independent history (Independent History). 
Latitude refers to the country-level absolute value of the latitude (La Porta et al., 1999). An 
extensive literature has established that a country’s absolute value latitude is positively associated 
with the quality of its political institutions (e.g., Treisman, 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson, 2001), which, in turn, should reduce lending corruption. Ethnic Fractionalization is the 
probability of two randomly selected persons not speaking the same language in a country. Prior 
studies find that economies with greater ethnic diversity demonstrate a preference for institutions 
that facilitate expropriation (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 2003, 
2006). Hence, we expect a positive association between ethnic fractionalization and lending 
corruption. Independent History refers to the percentage of years that the country has been 
independent since 1776. Prior literature has argued that countries that gained independence earlier 
have had a greater chance to modify colonial institutions and adopt policies that are more 
conducive to economic growth (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 2003, 2006). In line with this 
argument, we expect a positive association between independent history and lending corruption. 
We apply a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation in the IV approach. In the first stage, 
we use Lending Corruption as the dependent variable and State Media Ownership, Latitude, Ethnic 
Fractionalization, and Independent History as the instrumental variables. Consistent with 
expectations and prior studies, the results in the first stage regression indicate that lending 
corruption is positively related to State Media Ownership, Ethnic Fractionalization, and 
Independent History and negatively related to Latitude.23 The coefficients on these instrumental 
                                                           




variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are weak is rejected at the 5% level.24  
Table 4 reports the second-stage regression results. The coefficients on Lending Corruption 
are negative on loan cost (Column (1)) (β=-0.213; t=-1.84) and positive on loan amount and 
maturity (Columns (2) and (3)) (β=0.095, 0.208; t=3.45, 3.25). Overall, our IV estimation is highly 
consistent with our baseline model, reinforcing our findings that in high lending corruption 
countries, borrowers enjoy favorable loan contract terms. 
4.4 Cross-Sectional Tests 
4.4.1 The effect of financial distress 
Firms with financial distress face difficulties in getting financing from either equity or debt 
markets (Altman, 1984; Lang and Stulz, 1992). Since it is hard for distressed firms to finance 
through regular channels, they have an incentive to bribe lenders in order to solicit funding and 
the expected benefits of such bribery is likely to be greater for these borrowers. We therefore 
expect to find that the effects of lending corruption on bank loan contracting is more pronounced 
for distressed firms. 
To test this conjecture, we include the proxy for borrowers’ financial distress and its 
interaction with Lending Corruption (i.e., Financial Distress*Lending Corruption) in the baseline 
model (1). In particular, we measure firms’ Financial Distress using (-1)*Z-Score (Altman, 1968; 
2000). Panel A of Table 5 reports the results with dependent variables Ln (Loan Spread) in Column 
(1), Ln (Loan Size) in Column (2), and Ln (Loan Maturity) in Column (3). In the rest of the three 
panels of Table 5, we also present the results using the same dependent variables in the same order. 
                                                           
24 We employ the weak instrument test (Olea and Pflueger, 2013), where the null hypothesis is that the estimator 
approximate asymptotic bias or the instruments are weak. The F-values are 264.15, 493.03, and 493.28 in each of 
the three models. 
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The coefficient on Financial Distress is positive in Column (1)  and negative in Column (2), 
respectively, indicating that banks view distressed firms as riskier and thus charge them a higher 
spread and lend to them less. More importantly, the coefficient on Lending Corruption*Financial 
Distress in Column (2) (Column (3)) is positive and significant at 5% level, suggesting that the 
negative (positive) effects of lending corruption on loan size (loan maturity) are strengthened for 
distressed firms. We do not find significant results for loan spreads in Column (1). However, in 
general, the results in Panel A of Table 5 suggest that the effects of lending corruption on bank 
loan contracting (in terms of spread and loan size) are more pronounced for distressed firms. 
4.4.2 The effect of foreign banks 
A strand of the banking literature investigates the effect of foreign banks’ entry on the host 
country’s banks. Previous studies document that foreign banks increase market competition, 
improve the efficiency of domestic banks, and that they have much sounder financial profiles and 
a superior ability to monitor borrowers than do local banks (Unite and Sullivan, 2003; Detragiache, 
Tressel, and Gupta, 2008; Bruno and Hauswald, 2014). Following the existing literature, an 
increase in foreign ownership within the banking industry could improve operating efficiency and 
increase monitoring effectively and is expected to mitigate lending corruption’s impact on bank 
loan cost reduction.  
To test this hypothesis, we include Foreign Ownership, measured as the share of banks 
majority-owned by foreigners and its interaction with Lending Corruption (i.e., Foreign 
Ownership * Lending Corruption) into our baseline model. Panel B of Table 5 reports the results. 
In Column (1), the coefficient on Lending Corruption*Foreign Ownership is positive and 
significant, indicating that the effects of lending corruption on bank loan spread is less pronounced 
in countries with a higher foreign ownership in banks. The results suggest that foreign ownership 
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plays an important monitoring role in bank practices, making the relationship between lending 
corruption and the cost of debt weaker. In line with the effect on loan spread, the coefficient of the 
interaction term Lending Corruption* Foreign Ownership on loan size is positive and significant, 
as shown in Column (2), suggesting that the effects of lending corruption on loan size are less 
pronounced in countries with higher foreign ownership in banks. We do not find a significant effect 
on loan maturity in Column (3). In summary, Panel B of Table 5 shows that in countries with 
greater foreign ownership in banks, the effects of lending corruption on extending preferential 
bank loan terms (including loan spread and loan size) become weaker. 
4.4.3 The effect of religion 
As new institutional economics theory suggests, social embeddedness, including religion 
and norms, plays an important role in explaining social behaviors. Using the World Value Survey 
(WVS), Chen et al. (2016) find that country-level religion significantly influences bank loan 
contracting. More specifically, they find that firms in stronger religiosity countries have a lower 
cost of debt, a larger loan size, and lower upfront fees. They argue that managers in stronger 
religiosity environments are inclined to maintain higher ethical standards and are less likely to 
engage in risk-taking behaviors. Treisman (2000) systematically investigates the causes of 
corruption. He points out that compared to Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Islam, 
Protestantism can significantly constrain corruption. The reason he gives is that the Protestant 
tradition can effectively monitor the government and other parties in the society. This result is also 
in line with La Porta et al. (1999), who show that Protestant countries are more likely to have a 
developed economy and a higher quality government.  
In this cross-sectional test, we add a proxy for a country’s religion, Protestant, and its 
interaction with Lending Corruption. Protestant equals one if the primary religion of the country 
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is Protestantism, zero otherwise. As shown in Panel C of Table 5, Protestant is negatively 
correlated with loan spread and positively associated with loan maturity and loan size. In addition, 
the coefficient on Lending Corruption*Protestant is positive and significant at 1% level in Column 
(1), indicating that a Protestant tradition weakens the relationship between lending corruption and 
bank loan spread. In Column (2) and (3), we find that the coefficient on this interaction term is 
negative and significant at 5% level, suggesting that the relationship between lending corruption 
and loan size (loan maturity) is weaker in Protestant countries. Overall, our findings imply that the 
effects of lending corruption on bank loan contracting (in terms of loan spread and maturity) are 
weaker in Protestant countries. 
4.5 Lending Corruption and Loan Syndication 
In this section, we analyze the relationship between lending corruption and the loan 
structure, i.e., the loan allocation to lead banks among syndicated loans. The lead bank’s officials 
are typically those who interact with and work out the arrangements for a syndicated loan. Hence, 
information asymmetry exists between the lead bank and the participant banks (Sufi, 2007). In a 
society with high levels of lending corruption, participant banks, faced with information 
asymmetry, are more likely to be concerned  about whether a syndicated loan is tainted by bribery 
of the lead bank’s officials. In other words, the risk of losses due to adverse selection is greater for 
participant banks when there are corruption-related agency problems at the lead bank. Therefore, 
one might expect participant banks to either not participate in syndicated lending or to lend out 
less in countries where lending corruption is more prevalent. 
Table 6 reports the results of lending corruption on syndicate structure. In Column (1), the 
dependent variable is Syndicated Loan, an indicator of whether or not a loan is syndicated. We 
perform a logit regression and find that Lending Corruption is negative and significant (β=-1.565; 
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z=-6.34), suggesting that in countries with greater lending corruption, the likelihood of forming a 
syndicate is lower. Column (2) shows the results of the Poisson regression with Number of Lenders 
(i.e., the number of lenders in the syndicated loan) as the dependent variable. The coefficient on 
Lending Corruption is negative and significant (β=-0.176; z=-2.87), suggesting that in higher 
lending corruption countries, fewer lenders are willing to participate in syndicated loans. In 
Column (3), we investigate the effects of lending corruption on the lead bank allocation in 
syndicated loans. The dependent variable Lead Bank Allocation is defined as the percentage of 
loans that are lent out by lead banks. The coefficient on Lending Corruption is positive and 
significant (β=0.108; t=3.79),  indicating that in a corrupted lending environment, lead banks tend 
to hold a higher loan amount than do other banks.  
4.6 Lending Corruption, Leverage Policy, and Debt Choice 
Next, we examine firms’ response to lending corruption. More specifically, we test the 
impact of lending corruption on borrowers’ leverage policies and their debt choices. Table 7 
reports the results of lending corruption on leverage policy, where we use Leverage (Column (1)), 
Short-term Leverage (Column (2)), and Long-term Leverage (Column (3)) to capture borrowers’ 
leverage policies. Column (1) in Table 7 shows a positive relationship between Lending 
Corruption and the leverage ratio, suggesting that in countries with a higher level of lending 
corruption, firms are inclined to have a higher leverage ratio. In the next step, we explore which 
type of leverage (short vs. long term) increases with lending corruption. The results in Columns 
(2) and (3) suggest that lending corruption is positively associated with the long-term, but not 
short-term, leverage ratio. This is consistent with the finding in Column (3) of Table 2 that loan 
maturity is longer in high lending corruption countries. 
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Our analysis establishes that higher lending corruption leads to more favorable loan terms. 
A natural question to ask is whether borrowers take advantage of this corruption and increase 
financing through bank loans, as opposed to public debt. We thus examine the relationship between 
lending corruption and debt choice with debt structure data from Capital IQ.25  
As reported in Column (1) of Table 8, we regress the bank debt ratio on lending corruption. 
Bank Debt Ratio is defined as the summation of term loans and revolving credit scaled by total 
firm debt. The coefficient on Lending Corruption is positive and significant (t=5.91), suggesting 
that in a corrupt lending environment, companies are more likely to finance through bank debt. In 
comparison, in Column (2), we investigate the impact of Lending Corruption on Public Debt Ratio, 
defined as the sum of senior bonds and notes, subordinated bonds and notes, and commercial paper, 
scaled by total debt. As expected, we find that the coefficient on Lending Corruption is negative 
and significant (t=-3.24), indicating that companies in higher lending corruption countries are less 
likely to issue public debt. 
4.7 Lending Corruption, Loan Quality, Bank Performance, and Troubled Banks during the 
Financial Crisis 
In this section, we investigate the outcome of lending corruption by studying bank 
performance, loan quality, and the exposure of the banks to financial trouble during periods of 
financial crisis. With bribed bank officers making loan decisions, it is not surprising that banks 
face a significant risk of making loans with terms that are detrimental to the interests of the banks. 
In other words, lending corruption could result in an agency problem in loan contracting that 
eventually endangers banks.  
                                                           




In Table 9, we examine the impact of lending corruption on loan quality and bank 
performance. If lending corruption results in banks providing loans to unqualified borrowers, we 
expect those loans to be riskier and more likely to become non performing. To test this hypothesis, 
we regress loan quality measures on lending corruption. We use Bank NPL and Bank LLR to proxy 
for loan quality, where Bank NPL is non-performing loans scaled by gross loans, and Bank LLR is 
loan loss reserves scaled by gross loans. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 show that Lending 
Corruption is positive and significant in both regressions (t=2.49 and 6.43), indicating that loan 
quality is worse in countries with greater lending corruption. We measure bank performance by 
Bank ROA, that is, earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions divided by total assets. Column 
(3) of Table 9 shows that lending corruption is negatively correlated with Bank ROA, suggesting 
that bank performance is adversely affected by lending corruption.  
 Next, we examine whether lending corruption is related to banks’ financial trouble during 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Following Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2018), Bank Trouble is defined as an indicator that is equal to one if a bank was in financial 
trouble during the crisis period of 2007-2009, zero otherwise. A bank is considered in financial 
trouble in 2007-2009 if it satisfies at least one of the following criteria: (1) ROA<-2%,   (2) 
equity/assets < 0.06, and (3) loan loss provisions/total loans  > 0.01. To ensure that these banks 
were not troubled before 2007, banks that satisfy any of the above criteria in 2006 are deleted from 
the sample. Therefore, in this analysis, we only consider banks that were financially healthy in 
2006 but became troubled in 2007-2009.  Meanwhile, we also control for bank-level and country-
level variables. These variables include: Bank Size, the natural logarithm of total assets; Bank 
Growth, the growth rate in net interest revenue; Bank Equity, equity divided by total assets; Bank 
Big, an indicator that the bank is too big to fail, which equals one if the bank’s share of the 
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country’s total deposits is more than 10% and zero otherwise; Bank State-owned, an indicator that 
equals one if the bank is state owned, zero otherwise; Bank Listed, which equals one if the bank is 
listed and zero otherwise; Bank IFRS, which equals one if the bank adopts IFRS during the year 
and zero otherwise. 
Table 10 reports the results of lending corruption on the probability of banks entering 
financial trouble. As shown, the coefficient on Lending Corruption is positive and significant 
(β1=0.834, z=2.07), indicating that banks in higher lending corruption countries were more likely 
to get into financial trouble during the crisis period. In summary, our findings in this section 
reinforce the wealth transfer hypothesis that banks, as the losing principal, are more likely to suffer 
in countries with greater lending corruption as they end up with poorer loan quality, a worse 
earnings performance, and a higher chance of getting into trouble during a financial crisis. 
5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
To test the robustness of our main results, we also conduct a series of sensitivity analyses. 
First, since our sample is dominated by bank loans originated in the U.S., our results may be driven 
by bribery in the U.S. banking sector. To mitigate this concern, we repeat our analysis by dropping 
U.S. bank loans from the sample. Table 11 shows that our main results still hold. In addition, we 
also follow Edwards (1992) and Chen et al. (2016) and employ country-weighted regressions to 
address the country representation issue and find that the results are still robust. Second, Chen et 
al. (2016) find that firms located in areas with a higher level of religiosity receive more favorable 
bank loan terms. To mitigate the potential omitted variable issue, we also control for the country-
level degree of religiosity in our main regressions, where religiosity is measured as the principal 
component factor derived from the three religion variables: Member of religion, Religion 
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important, and Religion services, as in Chen et al. (2016).26 We find that our results do not alter. 
Third, we repeat our main analyses while clustering standard errors by countries and find our 
results are robust. Fourth, although it is reasonable to assume that corruption in one country’s 
banking sector is not easy to change quickly, one might still worry about the length of the sample 
period. We change the sample interval from 10 to 20 years. More specifically, we extend the 
sample to the years between 1990 and 2010 and we find our results are still robust. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Lending corruption is a critical issue. Prior literature mainly focuses on its determinants, 
with only limited research documenting its consequences. In this paper, we examine how lending 
corruption affects bank loan contracting. Specifically, we empirically examine how lending costs 
are affected by lending corruption across twenty-three different countries. In addition to the cost 
of bank loans, we also examine the non-pricing terms of loan contracts, including loan maturity 
and loan amount. We find that lending corruption helps reduce the cost of bank loans and is 
associated with a longer loan maturity and larger loan amounts. Next, we examine cross-sectional 
variation and find that the lending corruption effect is stronger when firms are under more 
financing constraints, and weaker in countries with higher foreign ownership of banks or where 
the primary religion is Protestant. Third, in the syndicated loan market, participant banks are 
inclined to lend out less in countries with where lending corruption is more prevalent. Fourth, we 
study to what extent lending corruption impacts the likelihood that firms choose bank loans versus 
public bonds. We find that corruption in bank lending serves to “grease the wheels” of borrowing 
                                                           
26 All those three country-level variables are from World Value Survey (WVS). Member of religion, Religion 
important and Religion services capture 1) The proportion of respondents who indicate they are affiliated with a 
religion based on the WVS. 2） The proportion of respondents who indicate the religion is important to themselves 
based on the WVS. 3） The proportion of respondents who indicate they attend religious services more than once a 
year based on the WVS.  
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from banks, with borrowers increasingly opting for private loans over public debt. Finally, we 
extend our analysis by investigating how lending corruption affects loan quality and bank financial 
health. We find that as lending corruption increases, both loan quality and bank financial health 
deteriorates. Our findings suggest that although borrowers may benefit from lending corruption 
(as do corrupted bank officials), banks are adversely impacted, which eventually harms bank 
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Variable name Variable definitions and constructions 
Lending Corruption Variable 
Lending Corruption Country-level average of the firm response to the question, “Is the 
corruption of bank officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your 
business?” (1, no obstacle; 2, minor obstacle; 3, moderate obstacle; 4, major 




Indicator variable that equals 1 for the observations in Pakistan, Peru, 
Sweden, and Turkey during the post-reform period, 0 otherwise. 
Bank Loan Variables 
Spread The amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar 
drawn down. Source:  DealScan. 
Ln (Spread) Natural logarithm of the amount the borrower pays in basis points over 
LIBOR for each dollar drawn down. Source: DealScan. 
Loan Size The USD loan amount of the facility in billions. Source: DealScan. 
Ln (Loan Size) Natural logarithm of the USD loan amount of the facility in billions. 
Source:  DealScan. 
Loan Maturity The number of the months to maturity. Source:  DealScan. 
Ln (Loan Maturity) Natural logarithm of the number of the months to maturity. Source:  
DealScan. 
Secured Indicator variable that equals 1 if the loan involves collateral, 0 otherwise.  
Source: DealScan. 
Performance Pricing Indicator variable that equals 1 if the loan includes a performance pricing 
provision, 0 otherwise.  Source: DealScan. 
Syndicated Loan Indicator variable that equals 1 if the loan is syndicated, 0 otherwise. 
Source: DealScan. 
Number of Lenders Number of lenders in the bank loan.  Source: DealScan. 
Lead Bank Allocation Percentage of loan held by the lead bank. Source: DealScan. 
Firm-level Variables 
Ln (Firm Size) Natural logarithm of total assets. Source: Compustat Global. 
Tangibility Gross property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets.  Source: 
Compustat Global. 
Leverage Current and long-term debt scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat 
Global. 
ROA Pre-tax income scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat Global. 
Tobin Q Following Duchin’s (2010) definition: 
Q=market value of assets/(0.9*book value of assets+0.1*market value of 
assets), where the market value of assets is the book value of total assets 
(AT) less the book value of equity (CEQ) less deferred taxes (TXTDB) plus 
the market value of equity (CSHO * PRCC).  Source: Compustat Global. 




Economic Growth GDP growth rate (US dollars, current prices). Source: International 
Monetary Fund. 
Inflation Inflation rate percentage. Source:  International Monetary Fund. 
Ln (GDP) Natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita (US dollars, current 
prices). Source:  International Monetary Fund.   
 
English Law Indicator variable that equals 1 if the legal origin is English law, zero 
otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
French Law Indicator variable that equals 1 if the legal origin is French law, zero 
otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
German Law Indicator variable that equals 1 if the legal origin is German law, zero 
otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
Rule of Law Rule of law index refers to the assessment of the law and order tradition in 
the country, scaled from 0 to 10. A higher rule of law score indicates more 
of a tradition of law and order. Sources: La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov, 
McLiesh, Shleifer (2007). 
Political Rights Political rights index ranging from 1 to 7 provided by Freedom House, with 
higher values indicating greater political rights. Source: Freedom House. 
Creditor Rights Creditor rights index ranging from 0 to 4, with higher values indicating 
greater creditor rights.  Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
Public Sector 
Corruption 
Public Sector Corruption is measured as (-1)*Control of Corruption, which 
captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
capture of the state by elites and private interests. Higher values of Public 
Sector Corruption indicate a higher corruption level.  Source: World 
Governance Indicators. 
Debt Choice Variables 
Bank Debt Ratio Bank debt scaled by total debt. Bank debt is defined as the sum of term 
loans and revolving credit.  Source: Capital IQ. 
Public Debt Ratio Public debt scaled by total debt. Public debt is defined as the sum of senior 
bonds and notes, subordinated bonds and notes, and commercial paper.  
Source: Capital IQ. 
Leverage Policy Variables 
Short-term Leverage  Current debt scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat Global. 
Long-term Leverage  Long-term debt scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat Global. 
Bank-level Test Variables 
Bank ROA Earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions divided by assets. Source: 
BankScope. 
Bank NPL Non-performance loan scaled by gross loans. Source: BankScope. 
Bank LLR Loan loss reserves scaled by gross loans. Source: BankScope. 
Bank Trouble =1 if the bank is in financial trouble during the crisis period 2007-2009, =0 
if otherwise. A troubled bank is defined as a bank that satisfies at least one 
of the following criteria in 2007-2009: 
(1)ROA<-2%,   (2) equity/assets < 0.06, and (3) loan loss provisions/total 
loans  > 0.01. To ensure that these banks were not troubled before 2007, 




sample. Thus, the sample banks used in the tests include only those that 
were healthy in 2006 but troubled in 2007-2009.  Source: BankScope. 
Bank Size Natural logarithm of total assets. Source: BankScope. 
Bank Growth Growth in net interest revenue. Source: BankScope. 
Bank Equity Equity divided by total assets. Source: BankScope. 
Bank Big An indicator that the bank is too big to fail. It equals 1 if the bank’s share of 
the country’s total deposits is more than 10%, 0 otherwise. Source: 
BankScope. 
Bank State-owned Indicator variable that equals 1 if the bank is state-owned, 0 otherwise. 
Source: BankScope. 
Bank Listed Indicator variable that equals 1 if the bank is listed, 0 otherwise. Source: 
BankScope. 
Bank IFRS Indicator variable that equals 1 if the bank adopts IFRS during the year, 0 
otherwise. Source: BankScope. 
Instrumental Variables 
State Media Ownership The market share of state-owned newspapers out of the aggregate market 
share of the five largest daily newspapers (by circulation). Source:  Djankov 
et al. (2003). 
Latitude The country-level absolute value of the latitude from La Porta et al. (1999). 
Source: La Porta et al. (1999) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 
(2003). 
Ethnic Fractionalization The probability that two randomly selected persons do not speak the same 
language in a country. Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003). 
Independent History The percentage of years that the country has been independent since 1776.  
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003). 
Cross-sectional Variables 
Financial Distress (-1)*Z_Score (Altman, 1968; 2000). Z-Score= 0.3*(Net Income/Total 
Assets)+1.0*(Sales/Total Assets)+1.4*(Retained Earnings/Total Assets) 
+1.2*(Working Capital/Total Assets)+0.6*(Market Value/Total Libliablity)  
Source: Compustat. 
Foreign Ownership Share of banks that are majority-owned by foreigners. Source:  Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006). 
Protestant Indicator variable that equals one if the primary religion of the country is 
Protestantism, zero otherwise.  Source: WVS survey. 
Fixed Effect Variables  
Industry Indicator variable that equals one for each of the Fama-French 48 industries, 
zero otherwise. Source:  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_4
8_ind_port.html. 
Year Indicator variable that equals one for each year and zero otherwise. 
Loan Purposes Indicator variable that equals one for each loan purpose, including corporate 
purpose, debt repayment, takeover, working capital, and other purposes and 
zero otherwise. Source: DealScan. 
Loan Types Indicator variables that equals one for each loan type, including 




Table 1：Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents the mean values of main country-level variables in Panel A and the descriptive statistics of main variables in regressions in 
Panel B.   
 

























Argentina 1.52 -0.07 0.07 8.84 0.00 1.00 0.00 5.35 5.72 1.00 0.43 49 
Brazil 1.28 0.12 0.12 8.42 0.00 1.00 0.00 6.32 5.74 1.00 0.17 106 
Canada 1.07 0.07 0.02 10.34 1.00 0.00 0.00 10.0
0 
7.00 1.00 -1.86 1,090 
Chile 1.20 0.07 0.05 8.73 0.00 1.00 0.00 7.02 6.37 2.00 -1.45 42 
Egypt 2.31 0.16 0.09 7.55 0.00 1.00 0.00 4.17 2.00 4.00 0.52 2 
France 1.28 0.07 0.02 10.41 0.00 1.00 0.00 8.98 7.00 0.00 -1.35 615 
Germany 1.51 0.06 0.01 10.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 9.23 7.00 3.00 -1.86 347 
India 1.60 0.14 0.06 6.79 1.00 0.00 0.00 4.17 5.99 4.00 0.40 95 
Indonesia 2.51 0.12 0.12 7.46 0.00 1.00 0.00 3.98 5.06 4.00 0.86 16 
Italy 1.16 0.07 0.02 10.32 0.00 1.00 0.00 8.33 7.00 2.00 -0.40 153 
Malaysia 1.70 0.08 0.04 8.49 1.00 0.00 0.00 6.78 3.55 4.00 -0.27 454 
Mexico 2.04 0.09 0.12 8.76 0.00 1.00 0.00 5.35 5.47 0.00 0.28 180 
Pakistan 2.53 0.02 0.11 6.53 1.00 0.00 0.00 3.03 3.33 4.00 1.04 11 
Peru 2.20 0.04 0.05 7.78 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.50 4.32 0.00 0.36 17 
Philippines 2.18 0.02 0.07 7.02 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.73 5.74 0.00 0.59 189 
Singapore 1.26 0.09 0.01 10.24 1.00 0.00 0.00 8.57 3.01 4.00 -2.19 289 
South Africa 1.11 0.00 0.08 8.26 1.00 0.00 0.00 4.42 6.62 3.00 -0.58 44 
Spain 1.26 0.08 0.03 10.13 0.00 1.00 0.00 7.80 7.00 2.00 -1.29 152 
Sweden 1.05 0.06 0.02 10.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.0
0 
7.00 2.00 -2.01 157 
Thailand 3.00 0.09 0.03 7.89 1.00 0.00 0.00 6.25 5.19 3.00 0.10 44 
Turkey 2.34 0.08 0.33 8.62 0.00 1.00 0.00 5.18 4.64 2.00 0.02 51 
USA 1.51 0.05 0.02 10.45 1.00 0.00 0.00 10.0
0 
7.00 1.00 -1.53 26,044 




Panel B: Bank loan-level variables 





Spread 181.000  116.000  75.000  175.000  250.000  23 22,116 
Ln (Spread) 4.932  0.837  4.331  5.170  5.526  23 22,116 
Loan Size 0.260  0.476  0.025  0.100  0.253  23 31,414 
Ln (Loan Size) 0.188  0.261  0.025  0.095  0.225  23 31,414 
Loan Maturity 48.440  31.570  24.000  48.000  60.000  23 31,414 
Ln (Loan Maturity) 3.667  0.735  3.219  3.892  4.111  23 31,414 
Performance Pricing 0.378  0.485  0.000  0.000  1.000  23 31,414 
Syndicated Loan 0.712  0.453  0.000  1.000  1.000  23 31,414 
Number of Lenders 9.925  9.858  3.000  7.000  13.000  23 22,376 
Lead Bank Allocation 0.183  0.314  0.000  0.000  0.235  23 22,376 
 
Panel C: Firm-level variables 





Ln (Firm Size) 6.419  2.149  4.950  6.354  7.800  23 31,414 
Tangibility 0.559  0.376  0.260  0.495  0.805  23 31,414 
Leverage 0.542  0.261  0.375  0.514  0.673  23 31,414 
ROA 0.022  0.167  -0.006  0.047  0.098  23 31,414 
 
Panel D: Country-level variables 





Lending Corruption 1.680 0.581 1.204 1.511 2.198 23 23 
Economic Growth 0.056  0.124  -0.007  0.056  0.128  23 215 
Inflation 0.077  0.161  0.016  0.034  0.075  23 344 
Ln (GDP) 8.950  1.294  8.036  8.892  10.180  23 344 
English Law 0.391 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 23 23 
French Law 0.522 0.511 0.000 1.000 1.000 23 23 
German Law 0.044 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.000 23 23 
Rule of Law 6.467 2.455 4.167 6.317 8.567 23 23 
Political Rights 5.696 1.460 5.000 6.000 7.000 23 23 
Creditor Rights 2.217 1.506 1.000 2.000 4.000 23 23 











Table 2: Relation between lending corruption and bank loan contracting 
 
The dependent variables are Ln (Loan Spread), Ln (Loan Size), and Ln (Maturity). The variable definitions are 
in Appendix A. For brevity, the coefficients for the industry, year, loan purpose, and loan type fixed effects are 
not reported. The regression coefficients are reported for each variable, followed by the heteroscedasticity-
robust t-statistic in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ln (Loan Spread) Ln (Loan Size) Ln (Loan Maturity) 
Lending Corruption -0.490*** 0.099*** 0.138*** 
 (-5.89) (3.59) (2.72) 
Ln (Loan Size) -0.632***  -0.149*** 
 (-26.19)  (-6.82) 
Ln (Loan Maturity) 0.117*** -0.013***  
 (16.16) (-6.74)  
Performance Pricing -0.016* 0.017*** 0.284*** 
 (-1.90) (6.70) (35.96) 
Ln (Firm Size) -0.151*** 0.077*** 0.014*** 
 (-43.23) (87.83) (4.89) 
Tangibility -0.186*** 0.007* -0.009 
 (-13.80) (1.83) (-0.70) 
Leverage 0.444*** -0.019*** 0.215*** 
 (27.03) (-4.86) (14.82) 
ROA -1.078*** -0.030*** 0.402*** 
 (-24.57) (-5.11) (16.25) 
Economic Growth -0.157 -0.097** -0.151 
 (-1.08) (-2.17) (-1.22) 
Inflation 1.229*** -0.370*** -1.032*** 
 (5.23) (-7.02) (-5.31) 
Ln (GDP) 0.0430 0.003 -0.077** 
 (0.84) (0.21) (-2.42) 
English Law 0.393*** -0.064*** -0.330*** 
 (6.06) (-2.60) (-6.38) 
French Law -0.154 0.004 -0.136** 
 (-1.60) (0.11) (-2.04) 
German Law 0.626*** -0.016 -0.363*** 
 (6.22) (-0.47) (-5.23) 
Rule of Law 0.0160 0.019** -0.013 
 (0.49) (2.20) (-0.72) 
Political Rights -0.102*** 0.036*** 0.054*** 
 (-3.78) (7.86) (5.14) 
Creditor Rights -0.172*** 0.034*** 0.044*** 
 (-7.97) (5.56) (3.69) 
Public Sector Corruption 0.369*** -0.007 -0.188*** 
 (5.32) (-0.42) (-4.99) 
Intercept 6.525*** -0.913*** 4.141*** 
 (21.81) (-11.66) (21.40) 
Loan Purpose/Loan Type Included Included Included 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of observations 22,116 31,414 31,414 




Table 3: Relation between lending corruption and bank loan contracting: Anti-corruption law reforms 
 
The dependent variables are Ln (Loan Spread), Ln (Loan Size), and Ln (Maturity). The variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. For brevity, the coefficients for the industry, year, loan purpose, and loan type fixed effects are not 
reported. The regression coefficients are reported for each variable, followed by the heteroscedasticity-robust t-
statistic in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ln (Loan Spread) Ln (Loan Size) Ln (Loan Maturity) 
Anti-Corruption Law 0.219** 0.035 -0.238** 
 (1.97) (1.11) (-2.14) 
Ln (Loan Size) -0.410***  0.108*** 
 (-20.87)  (4.81) 
Ln (Loan Maturity) 0.050*** 0.009***  
 (8.72) (4.81)  
Performance Pricing -0.052*** 0.035*** 0.194*** 
 (-6.70) (12.91) (20.18) 
Ln (Firm Size) -0.101*** 0.053*** 0.015* 
 (-13.38) (22.53) (1.79) 
Tangibility -0.092*** -0.009 -0.011 
 (-3.51) (-0.98) (-0.37) 
Leverage 0.171*** -0.006 -0.090*** 
 (7.52) (-0.75) (-3.36) 
ROA -0.695*** 0.023** 0.254*** 
 (-18.26) (2.05) (6.35) 
Economic Growth -0.225 -0.068** -0.060 
 (-1.62) (-2.06) (-0.51) 
Inflation 1.369*** -0.199*** -1.030*** 
 (7.36) (-3.17) (-4.63) 
Ln (GDP) 0.009 0.009 -0.007 
 (0.25) (1.16) (-0.26) 
Intercept 5.148*** -0.333*** 3.965*** 
 (13.19) (-4.06) (13.71) 
Loan Purpose/Loan Type Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included 
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included 
Number of observations 22,116 31,414 31,414 
















Table 4: Relation between lending corruption and bank loan contracting: IV Estimation  
The dependent variables are Ln (Loan Spread), Ln (Loan Size), and Ln (Maturity). The variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. For brevity, the coefficients for the industry, year, loan purpose, and loan type fixed effects are not 
reported. The regression coefficients are reported for each variable, followed by the heteroscedasticity-robust t-
statistic in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ln (Loan Spread) Ln (Loan Size) Ln (Loan Maturity) 
Lending Corruption -0.213* 0.095*** 0.208*** 
 (-1.84) (3.45) (3.25) 
Ln (Loan Size) -0.630***  -0.150*** 
 (-26.08)  (-6.89) 
Ln (Loan Maturity) 0.117*** -0.013***  
 (16.14) (-6.74)  
Performance Pricing -0.017** 0.017*** 0.283*** 
 (-2.05) (6.74) (35.92) 
Ln (Firm Size) -0.151*** 0.077*** 0.014*** 
 (-43.34) (87.90) (4.89) 
Tangibility -0.184*** 0.007* -0.008 
 (-13.71) (1.83) (-0.66) 
Leverage 0.443*** -0.019*** 0.214*** 
 (27.01) (-4.86) (14.81) 
ROA -1.078*** -0.030*** 0.403*** 
 (-24.58) (-5.13) (16.31) 
Economic Growth -0.137 -0.097** -0.149 
 (-0.94) (-2.17) (-1.20) 
Inflation 1.121*** -0.369*** -1.045*** 
 (4.63) (-7.05) (-5.39) 
Ln (GDP) -0.049 0.004 -0.094*** 
 (-0.83) (0.28) (-2.80) 
English Law 0.372*** -0.063*** -0.335*** 
 (5.76) (-2.60) (-6.48) 
French Law -0.063 0.002 -0.105 
 (-0.63) (0.06) (-1.52) 
German Law 0.489*** -0.014 -0.397*** 
 (4.55) (-0.41) (-5.54) 
Rule of Law 0.039 0.019** -0.005 
 (1.18) (2.23) (-0.27) 
Political Rights -0.067** 0.036*** 0.060*** 
 (-2.40) (8.07) (5.49) 
Creditor Rights -0.140*** 0.034*** 0.053*** 
 (-6.06) (5.92) (4.14) 
Public Sector Corruption 0.247*** -0.00500 -0.219*** 
 (3.02) (-0.28) (-5.19) 
Intercept 6.393*** -0.907*** 4.045*** 
 (21.30) (-11.94) (20.55) 
Loan Purpose/Loan Type Included Included Included 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of observations 22,116 31,414 31,414 






Table 5: Cross-sectional test: Relation between lending corruption and bank loan contracting 
 
The dependent variables are Ln (Loan Spread), Ln (Loan Size), and Ln (Maturity). The variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. For brevity, the coefficients for the industry, year, loan purpose, and loan type fixed effects are not 
reported. The regression coefficients are reported for each variable, followed by the heteroscedasticity-robust t-
statistic in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Financial distress 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ln (Loan Spread) Ln (Loan Size) Ln (Loan Maturity) 
Lending Corruption* Financial Distress -0.019 0.025*** 0.023** 
 (-1.02) (5.81) (1.97) 
Lending Corruption -0.507*** 0.146*** 0.182*** 
 (-5.66) (4.98) (3.28) 
Financial Distress 0.053* -0.036*** -0.027 
 (1.94) (-5.43) (-1.58) 
Ln (Loan Size) -0.635***  -0.152*** 
 (-26.31)  (-6.98) 
Ln (Loan Maturity) 0.114*** -0.013***  
 (15.90) (-6.89)  
Performance Pricing -0.019** 0.017*** 0.284*** 
 (-2.26) (6.82) (35.96) 
Ln (Firm Size) -0.158*** 0.076*** 0.012*** 
 (-45.00) (88.04) (4.43) 
Tangibility -0.198*** 0.006 -0.012 
 (-14.83) (1.58) (-0.99) 
Leverage 0.339*** -0.029*** 0.186*** 
 (18.84) (-6.36) (11.59) 
ROA -0.937*** -0.021*** 0.430*** 
 (-21.11) (-3.42) (16.54) 
Economic Growth -0.130 -0.083* -0.133 
 (-0.90) (-1.86) (-1.07) 
Inflation 1.342*** -0.402*** -1.050*** 
 (5.03) (-7.59) (-5.41) 
Ln (GDP) 0.047 0.004 -0.074** 
 (0.92) (0.29) (-2.32) 
English Law 0.383*** -0.062** -0.329*** 
 (5.92) (-2.51) (-6.37) 
French Law -0.154 0.005 -0.136** 
 (-1.60) (0.16) (-2.04) 
German Law 0.607*** -0.009 -0.359*** 
 (6.01) (-0.27) (-5.16) 
Rule of Law 0.021 0.020** -0.013 
 (0.65) (2.29) (-0.70) 
Political Rights -0.095*** 0.035*** 0.054*** 
 (-3.58) (7.79) (5.16) 
Creditor Rights -0.164*** 0.033*** 0.043*** 
 (-7.51) (5.38) (3.61) 
Public Sector Corruption 0.383*** -0.003 -0.184*** 
 (5.45) (-0.18) (-4.87) 
Intercept 6.592*** -0.980*** 4.082*** 
 (21.95) (-12.32) (20.76) 
Loan Purpose/Loan Type Included Included Included 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of observations 22,116 31,414 31,414 
Adjusted R2 0.538 0.451 0.214 
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Panel B: Foreign ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ln (Loan Spread) Ln (Loan Size) Ln (Loan Maturity) 
Lending Corruption* Foreign Ownership 0.021* -0.008*** 0.001 
 (1.77) (-2.87) (0.06) 
Lending Corruption -1.018*** 0.154*** -0.084 
 (-4.59) (3.02) (-1.00) 
Foreign Ownership -0.060*** 0.017*** -0.007 
 (-2.91) (3.54) (-0.49) 
Ln (Loan Size) -0.649***  -0.149*** 
 (-25.10)  (-6.22) 
Ln (Loan Maturity) 0.122*** -0.012***  
 (16.06) (-6.14)  
Performance Pricing -0.037*** 0.014*** 0.299*** 
 (-4.40) (5.72) (36.49) 
Ln (Firm Size) -0.153*** 0.076*** 0.016*** 
 (-41.67) (82.89) (5.27) 
Tangibility -0.206*** 0.009** -0.00400 
 (-14.84) (2.48) (-0.33) 
Leverage 0.461*** -0.017*** 0.199*** 
 (27.26) (-4.32) (13.26) 
ROA -1.057*** -0.027*** 0.393*** 
 (-23.58) (-4.75) (15.55) 
Economic Growth -0.346 -0.304*** -0.218 
 (-1.21) (-3.72) (-1.21) 
Inflation 0.451 -0.407*** -1.033*** 
 (0.98) (-4.81) (-3.93) 
Ln (GDP) -0.264*** 0.051** -0.0960 
 (-3.20) (2.01) (-1.47) 
English Law 0.911*** -0.231*** -0.297*** 
 (6.28) (-5.63) (-2.87) 
French Law 1.156*** -0.309*** -0.183 
 (3.69) (-4.09) (-0.93) 
German Law 1.184*** -0.036 -0.195** 
 (6.78) (-0.78) (-2.21) 
Rule of Law 0.017 0.037** -0.013 
 (0.33) (2.48) (-0.32) 
Political Rights -0.349*** 0.052*** -0.038 
 (-3.91) (3.61) (-1.23) 
Creditor Rights -0.365*** 0.0120 -0.025 
 (-5.32) (0.78) (-0.77) 
Public Sector Corruption -0.373** 0.203*** -0.149 
 (-2.27) (4.73) (-1.24) 
Intercept 10.917*** -1.284*** 5.402*** 
 (10.05) (-5.18) (11.17) 
Loan Purpose/Loan Type Included Included Included 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of observations 20,393 28,124 28,124 










Panel C: Religion  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ln (Loan Spread) Ln (Loan Size) Ln (Loan Maturity) 
Lending Corruption* Protestant 1.453*** -0.180** -1.015*** 
 (4.04) (-2.30) (-5.38) 
Lending Corruption -1.696*** 0.191*** 0.641*** 
 (-8.30) (3.70) (4.54) 
Protestant -1.665*** 0.184* 1.366*** 
 (-3.33) (1.69) (5.25) 
Ln (Loan Size) -0.633***  -0.149*** 
 (-26.25)  (-6.84) 
Ln (Loan Maturity) 0.117*** -0.013***  
 (16.22) (-6.76)  
Performance Pricing -0.018** 0.018*** 0.285*** 
 (-2.13) (7.23) (35.88) 
Ln (Firm Size) -0.150*** 0.077*** 0.014*** 
 (-43.04) (87.45) (4.99) 
Tangibility -0.186*** 0.006 -0.007 
 (-13.87) (1.62) (-0.60) 
Leverage 0.443*** -0.019*** 0.214*** 
 (27.03) (-4.67) (14.75) 
ROA -1.081*** -0.031*** 0.400*** 
 (-24.63) (-5.27) (16.16) 
Economic Growth -0.083 -0.127*** -0.100 
 (-0.52) (-2.69) (-0.77) 
Inflation 1.038*** -0.327*** -1.049*** 
 (4.60) (-6.28) (-5.19) 
Ln (GDP) 0.078 0.042** -0.165*** 
 (1.14) (2.39) (-3.47) 
English Law 0.271** -0.054* -0.117 
 (2.41) (-1.67) (-1.58) 
French Law -0.146 -0.057 0.103 
 (-1.06) (-1.47) (1.04) 
German Law 0.461** 0.029 -0.041 
 (2.49) (0.60) (-0.37) 
Rule of Law -0.048 0.008 0.058** 
 (-1.03) (0.82) (2.20) 
Political Rights -0.154*** 0.043*** 0.040* 
 (-4.30) (5.34) (1.95) 
Creditor Rights -0.162*** 0.022*** -0.003 
 (-5.20) (2.84) (-0.19) 
Public Sector Corruption 0.406*** 0.017 -0.228*** 
 (5.18) (0.91) (-5.01) 
Intercept 8.635*** -1.269*** 3.593*** 
 (16.51) (-9.33) (8.89) 
Loan Purpose/Loan Type Included Included Included 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of observations 22,116 31,414 31,414 






Table 6: Relation between lending corruption and loan syndication 
 
The dependent variables are Syndicated Loan, Number of Lenders, and Lead Bank Allocation. The variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. For brevity, the coefficients for the industry, year, loan purpose, and loan type 
fixed effects are not reported. The regression coefficients are reported for each variable, followed by the 
heteroscedasticity-robust t- or z-statistic in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Syndicated Loan Number of Lenders Lead Bank Allocation 
Lending Corruption -1.565*** -0.176*** 0.108*** 
 (-6.34) (-2.87) (3.79) 
Ln (Loan Size) 2.641*** 0.659*** 0.005 
 (8.92) (28.90) (0.51) 
Ln (Loan Maturity) 0.503*** 0.088*** 0.011*** 
 (19.05) (10.03) (3.35) 
Performance Pricing 0.978*** 0.312*** 0.001 
 (27.01) (24.16) (0.24) 
Ln (Firm Size) 0.536*** 0.161*** -0.020*** 
 (32.55) (37.14) (-11.89) 
Tangibility 0.045 -0.050*** 0.008 
 (0.85) (-2.78) (1.18) 
Leverage 0.502*** 0.199*** -0.070*** 
 (8.12) (6.59) (-8.30) 
ROA 1.104*** 0.156** -0.028 
 (10.03) (2.47) (-1.54) 
Economic Growth -1.043* 0.0220 -0.730*** 
 (-1.93) (0.16) (-9.37) 
Inflation 2.016** 1.104*** -0.016 
 (2.32) (5.25) (-0.14) 
Ln (GDP) 1.038*** 0.358*** -0.034* 
 (7.05) (10.65) (-1.77) 
English Law 0.626 0.053 -0.178*** 
 (1.60) (1.00) (-5.24) 
French Law 0.484 0.053 0.118*** 
 (1.06) (0.76) (2.77) 
German Law 1.236** 0.248*** -0.219*** 
 (2.49) (3.61) (-5.43) 
Rule of Law -0.292*** -0.161*** -0.007 
 (-3.18) (-7.59) (-0.58) 
Political Rights 0.022 0.009 0.059*** 
 (0.50) (0.75) (8.83) 
Creditor Rights -0.120** -0.035** 0.066*** 
 (-2.00) (-2.44) (8.96) 
Public Sector Corruption 0.0960 -0.0130 -0.099*** 
 (0.52) (-0.30) (-4.68) 
Intercept -11.599*** -1.997*** 0.350*** 
 (-11.04) (-8.19) (3.16) 
Loan Purpose/Loan Type Included Included Included 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of observations 31,414 22,376 22,376 





Table 7: Relation between lending corruption and leverage policy 
 
The dependent variables are Leverage, Short-term Leverage, and Long-term Leverage. The variable definitions 
are in Appendix A. For brevity, the coefficients for the industry and year fixed effects are not reported. The 
regression coefficients are reported for each variable, followed by the heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistic in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Leverage Short-term Leverage Long-term Leverage 
Lending Corruption 0.017*** -0.003 0.024*** 
 (2.75) (-0.76) (4.98) 
Tangibility 0.022*** -0.002*** 0.022*** 
 (46.96) (-7.52) (71.77) 
ROA -0.075*** -0.037*** -0.024*** 
 (-18.40) (-14.25) (-12.70) 
Tobin Q 0.038*** 0.025*** -0.004*** 
 (24.51) (25.56) (-4.97) 
Prob. Bankruptcy 0.517*** 0.303*** 0.136*** 
 (64.78) (57.81) (32.62) 
Economic Growth -0.012 -0.059*** 0.058*** 
 (-0.75) (-5.42) (5.35) 
Inflation -0.002*** -0.000 -0.002*** 
 (-10.80) (-0.61) (-15.24) 
Ln (GDP) -0.034*** -0.019*** -0.015*** 
 (-9.22) (-8.56) (-5.43) 
English Law 0.083*** 0.006 0.072*** 
 (9.01) (1.25) (10.10) 
French Law 0.083*** 0.059*** 0.019** 
 (8.04) (10.92) (2.34) 
German Law 0.050*** 0.026*** 0.014* 
 (4.55) (4.40) (1.66) 
Rule of Law 0.029*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 
 (13.91) (8.83) (11.80) 
Political Rights -0.002** -0.015*** 0.014*** 
 (-2.05) (-18.67) (16.62) 
Creditor Rights 0.00200 0.008*** -0.005*** 
 (1.49) (9.04) (-4.98) 
Public Sector Corruption 0.012** 0.011*** 0.000 
 (2.32) (2.98) (0.12) 
Intercept 0.052** 0.224*** -0.151*** 
 (1.98) (14.13) (-7.99) 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of observations 94,673 94,673 94,673 








Table 8: Relation between lending corruption and debt choice 
 
The dependent variables are Bank Debt Ratio and Public Debt Ratio. The variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
For brevity, the coefficients for the industry and year fixed effects are not reported. The regression coefficients 
are reported for each variable, followed by the heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistic in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Bank Debt Ratio Public Debt Ratio 
Lending Corruption 0.085*** -0.045*** 
 (5.91) (-3.24) 
Ln (Firm Size) -0.045*** 0.043*** 
 (-45.58) (42.67) 
ROA 0.027*** -0.023*** 
 (6.29) (-5.20) 
Tobin Q -0.031*** 0.032*** 
 (-11.63) (11.85) 
Prob. Bankruptcy -0.144*** 0.135*** 
 (-13.25) (12.11) 
Economic Growth 0.131*** -0.097*** 
 (3.50) (-2.67) 
Inflation 0.003** -0.002 
 (2.39) (-1.34) 
Ln (GDP) -0.124*** 0.124*** 
 (-14.27) (14.54) 
English Law -0.100*** 0.111*** 
 (-3.35) (3.72) 
French Law 0.030 -0.045 
 (0.92) (-1.39) 
German Law -0.098*** 0.0430 
 (-2.87) (1.26) 
Rule of Law 0.020*** -0.001 
 (3.53) (-0.23) 
Political Rights 0.012*** -0.017*** 
 (3.64) (-5.14) 
Creditor Rights 0.031*** -0.024*** 
 (8.30) (-6.41) 
Public Sector Corruption -0.070*** 0.084*** 
 (-5.31) (6.49) 
Intercept 1.616*** -0.851*** 
 (21.27) (-11.34) 
Industry/Year Included Included 
Number of observations 22,638 22,638 





Table 9: Relationship between lending corruption, loan quality, and bank performance 
 
The dependent variables are Bank NPL, Bank LLR and Bank ROA. The variable definitions are in Appendix 
A. For brevity, the coefficients for the industry and year fixed effects are not reported. The regression 
coefficients are reported for each variable, followed by the heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistic in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Bank NPL Bank LLR Bank ROA 
Lending Corruption 0.007** 0.023*** -0.004*** 
 (2.49) (6.43) (-6.88) 
Bank Size -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (-5.50) (-7.41) (39.22) 
Bank Growth -0.027*** -0.077*** -0.026*** 
 (-6.43) (-9.58) (-21.96) 
Bank Equity -0.003*** -0.008*** 0.002*** 
 (-3.05) (-3.44) (5.52) 
Bank Big -0.059*** 0.016 0.329*** 
 (-2.71) (0.36) (43.82) 
Bank State-owned 0.016*** 0.013*** -0.005*** 
 (4.71) (2.59) (-10.79) 
Bank Listed -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.000 
 (-8.30) (-5.05) (1.50) 
Bank IFRS -0.011*** 0.016*** 0.000 
 (-4.34) (7.63) (1.16) 
Economic Growth -0.104*** -0.064*** 0.013*** 
 (-16.37) (-8.04) (11.00) 
Inflation -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (-3.44) (3.06) (3.23) 
Ln (GDP) -0.025*** -0.018*** 0.002*** 
 (-27.47) (-13.65) (13.15) 
English Law 0.007** -0.008*** 0.000 
 (2.11) (-3.63) (0.72) 
French Law 0.023*** 0.024*** -0.007*** 
 (7.36) (9.91) (-12.79) 
German Law 0.050*** 0.012*** -0.005*** 
 (12.51) (4.37) (-7.49) 
Rule of Law 0.011*** -0.006 0.001 
 (2.75) (-1.46) (1.10) 
Political Rights -0.005*** -0.002*** 0.000*** 
 (-6.03) (-2.61) (3.08) 
Creditor Rights 0.004*** -0.007*** 0.000 
 (3.70) (-7.69) (0.88) 
Public Sector Corruption 0.009** -0.010** 0.004*** 
 (2.56) (-2.48) (6.09) 
Intercept 0.323*** 0.279*** 0.012*** 
 (25.28) (16.00) (5.23) 
Year Included Included Included 
Number of observations 93,032 104,411 128,835 





Table 10: Relationship between lending corruption and bank trouble during the financial crisis 
 
The dependent variable is Bank Trouble. The variable definitions are in Appendix A. The regression 
coefficients are reported for each variable, followed by the heteroscedasticity-robust z-statistic in 




 Bank Trouble 
Lending Corruption 0.834** 
 (2.07) 
Bank Size 0.270*** 
 (17.82) 
Bank Growth 1.836*** 
 (12.41) 
Bank Equity -2.316*** 
 (-4.86) 
Bank Big 7.653*** 
 (4.86) 
Bank State-owned 9.119** 
 (2.55) 
Bank Listed -0.614* 
 (-1.72) 
Bank IFRS 0.942** 
 (2.23) 




Ln (GDP) 0.268 
 (1.04) 
English Law 0.444 
 (1.02) 
French Law -0.947* 
 (-1.82) 
German Law -0.276 
 (-0.15) 
Rule of Law -1.577 
 (-1.45) 
Political Rights -0.135 
 (-1.00) 
Creditor Rights -0.524*** 
 (-2.65) 




Number of observations 9,970 








Table 11: Relation between lending corruption and bank loan contracting: Excluding US 
 
The dependent variables are Ln (Loan Spread), Ln (Loan Size), and Ln (Maturity). The variable definitions 
are in Appendix A. For brevity, the coefficients for the industry, year, loan purpose, and loan type fixed 
effects are not reported. The regression coefficients are reported for each variable, followed by the 
heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistic in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ln (Loan Spread) Ln (Loan Size) Ln (Loan Maturity) 
Lending Corruption -0.997*** 0.184*** 0.142** 
 (-7.97) (5.12) (2.28) 
Ln (Loan Size) -0.546***  -0.029 
 (-10.05)  (-0.76) 
Ln (Loan Maturity) 0.105*** -0.004  
 (4.85) (-0.76)  
Performance Pricing 0.172*** 0.094*** 0.049* 
 (5.61) (7.15) (1.73) 
Ln (Firm Size) -0.107*** 0.067*** -0.025*** 
 (-10.11) (26.47) (-3.94) 
Tangibility -0.083* -0.018 -0.076** 
 (-1.82) (-1.49) (-2.35) 
Leverage 0.397*** -0.071*** 0.138*** 
 (5.75) (-3.51) (2.79) 
ROA -1.168*** -0.132*** 0.167* 
 (-6.98) (-3.50) (1.81) 
Economic Growth -0.175 -0.196*** 0.060 
 (-0.93) (-3.63) (0.38) 
Inflation 1.415*** -0.372*** -1.287*** 
 (5.57) (-6.36) (-6.30) 
Ln (GDP) 0.156*** 0.023 -0.081** 
 (2.99) (1.46) (-2.24) 
English Law 0.291*** -0.041 -0.353*** 
 (4.31) (-1.55) (-6.69) 
French Law -0.274*** -0.012 -0.080 
 (-2.80) (-0.37) (-1.17) 
German Law 0.679*** -0.051 -0.361*** 
 (6.57) (-1.43) (-5.22) 
Rule of Law -0.080** 0.025*** 0.000 
 (-2.15) (2.85) (0.02) 
Political Rights -0.179*** 0.038*** 0.061*** 
 (-5.84) (7.57) (5.54) 
Creditor Rights -0.201*** 0.028*** 0.059*** 
 (-8.33) (4.70) (4.71) 
Public Sector Corruption 0.326*** 0.015 -0.140*** 
 (4.27) (0.94) (-3.56) 
Intercept 7.093*** -1.142*** 4.652*** 
 (12.44) (-7.71) (15.01) 
Loan Purpose/Loan Type Included Included Included 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of observations 2,269 5,370 5,370 
Adjusted R2 0.534 0.337 0.140 
 
